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     I 
 
For many years analyses of sterling and macroeconomic policy in Britain during the 
1960s focussed on the struggle of the Wilson governments to defend sterling between 
1964 and 1967. Until recently little had been published on the tribulations of sterling 
after devaluation from £1 = $2.80 to £1 = $2.40 on 18 November, 1967, although it has 
been acknowledged that the post-November 1967 sterling rate required considerable 
international support. For example, Cairncross and Eichengreen show that the UK 
needed £1300m in backing from overseas monetary authorities in 1968
2
. This allowed 
it to cover a current and short-term capital account deficit of over £1400m without 
running down the gold and foreign exchange reserves to the point at which another 
devaluation became inescapable.  
 
The accepted explanation for this apparent generosity has been that after devaluation 
the international financial community, in the shape of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), the central bankers of the leading industrial states, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), were all determined to support sterling in order to 
avert another devaluation. They feared that the collapse of the junior reserve currency 
could lead to the development of pressure on the main one, the dollar, itself also in 
deficit with the rest of the world. This would threaten the ability of the USA to maintain 
gold-dollar convertibility at the price of the fixed price of $35 to one ounce, and in so 
doing threaten to destabilise the Bretton Woods international monetary system based on 
the universal acceptability of the dollar and on fixed (but adjustable) exchange rates. 
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The fear was not groundless: there had been a rush to sell dollars and buy gold at the 
time of the sterling devaluation. The widely accepted imperative of sustaining Bretton 
Woods meant that sterling's survival throughout 1968 at the $2.40 parity was less 
troubled than it had been between October 1964 and November 1967, despite the 
existence of a deficit considerably larger than at any point in the previous four years
3
. 
 
Recent articles by Michael Oliver and Arran Hamilton have however led to a shift of 
perspective following their demonstration of sterling's vulnerability and exposure to 
recurrent crises after its November 1967 devaluation
4
. Their important work shows that 
in response to the weakness of sterling in the markets the Treasury developed 
contingency plans for floating the currency and blocking the sterling balances, and 
discussed with the United States ways in which the international monetary system 
could be reformed. While this is accurate as far as it goes, the argument ignores the 
events of the summer and autumn of 1969 and also underplays the government's 
commitment to the Bretton Woods order of fixed exchange rates and its hostility to 
floating. This article maintains that the Prime Minister (Harold Wilson) and the 
Chancellor (Roy Jenkins) believed the maintenance of this order to be essential to the 
success of the post-devaluation economic strategy. Given that floating rates were 
incompatible with Bretton Woods they could only be defended as a strategy of last 
resort, to be implemented in the event of its breakdown. In the absence of such an 
eventuality, they were seen as likely to bring disaster on both the British and the 
international economy: Wilson and Jenkins feared that if they were forced to float the 
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pound they would be faced with the defeat of their post-devaluation economic strategy 
and the collapse of British social democracy.  
     
II 
 
There were three sterling crises in 1968-69. These came in March and November 1968 
and in August 1969. Moreover, for much of the period between December 1967 and 
September 1969 sterling was under pressure in the foreign exchange markets even 
when its parity was not being threatened. Sterling's weakness in this period stemmed 
from two underlying causes. The first was fragile confidence in the Labour 
government's post devaluation economic strategy. This was intended to deliver a 
balance of payments surplus running at an annual rate of £500m, to be achieved by the 
end of 1969. It was a tall order, but the surplus had to be large enough to permit 
repayment of the large external debts acquired by the Labour government in the course 
of its efforts to defend the old exchange rate, and to provide the platform for a sustained 
expansion of the British economy – the Holy Grail of economic policy for the best part 
of a decade.  
 
Much of this debt was short-term. It was owed to the US Federal Reserve Bank and to 
central banks in the leading industrialised states under three month currency swap 
arrangements organised by the BIS. In addition, the Bank of England had provided very 
considerable support to the forward market in sterling (mostly three month) during the 
autumn of 1967; these obligations had amounted to $4782m on devaluation
5
. These 
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either had to be rolled over or (more likely) redeemed at the old rate. By the end of 
February 1968 the reserves totalled $2771m and available short-term borrowing 
facilities were $1686m. Indebtedness to foreign central banks and the BIS was running 
at $3384m and forward market commitments now stood at $2851m. There was no 
doubt that liabilities exceeded assets. Excluding from calculations the forward position 
on the one side and the undrawn credits on the other, the UK had a negative reserve 
position of $-613m
6
.  
 
The position of sterling was however even more precarious than suggested by these 
figures, thanks to the existence of foreign owned sterling balances which were banked 
in London. These, which were worth almost £4 billion ($9.6 billion), had arisen as a 
result of sterling's historic role as an international reserve and trading currency. The 
balances represented significant liabilities, and were demonstrating considerable 
volatility. In the six weeks after devaluation, Overseas Sterling Area (OSA) balances, 
belonging for the most part to interests in Commonwealth countries or nations with 
longstanding economic ties to the UK, were run down by £200m, a very high figure in 
relation to fluctuations normally recorded in this category of holdings over the recent 
past
7
.Their withdrawal from London in favour of diversification into other currencies 
added to the strain on Britain's external financial position, since the Bank of England, 
acting through the Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA), was required to provide gold 
and dollars (or deutschmarks or any other currency in demand) from the UK foreign 
currency reserves in exchange for unwanted sterling. There was a danger that the losses 
to the reserves provoked by switching out of sterling on such a scale would lead 
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balance holders to fear further sterling depreciation. In consequence they would decide 
to continue with diversification, which in turn would cause more pressure on the 
reserves and therefore add to anxiety about the future of the exchange rate. A vicious 
circle loomed, threatening to cause financial crisis in the City, the abrupt termination of 
sterling's international role and disruption to the international monetary system.  
 
Labour had been searching since the summer of 1965 for international agreement on 
measures to underpin sterling for the long-term
8
, thereby forestalling such a 
denouement. The best that could be achieved was the Sterling Group Arrangement 
(SGA), established by the BIS in June 1966.  It provided the Bank of England with up 
to $1 billion in credits. These could, however, only be drawn on to finance 50 per cent 
of the losses to the UK reserves caused by diversification on the part of OSA and NSA 
members. Initially the SGA was limited to 9 months but it was renewed annually until 
liquidated by instalments between September 1969 and January 1971
9
.  
 
Early in 1968 the question of opening talks designed to reach agreement on a larger and 
less restrictive arrangement was raised again, in Basle, by Sir Leslie O'Brien, Governor 
of the Bank of England. Discussions between Bank officials and BIS staff began in 
March. But it was clear that any agreement to insure sterling would take time to 
organise, and in the meantime the government needed to show its commitment to a 
macroeconomic strategy which would, in facilitating an external surplus, remove the 
doubts about the ability of the UK to service its debt and about whether sterling's new 
value would prove to be any more trustworthy than the old one.  
 6 
 
Unfortunately, it took over a year before the government was able to convince Britain's 
creditors and the foreign exchange markets that its economic strategy would work. In 
other circumstances, central bankers, foreign governments, and even the markets might 
have been less nervous about a currency's future. But they were perhaps over-sensitive 
about sterling since they had already witnessed what they now saw as a set of false 
dawns, between September 1965 and May 1966 and between September 1966 and the 
summer of 1967, when it had briefly seemed as if Britain's external position was on the 
road to recovery from the red. As a result, each piece of discouraging news, whether it 
related to the monthly trade figures or to events beyond the control of the government 
(such as trouble in the Middle East, the fortunes of US forces in Vietnam or political 
instability in France) was liable to shake the pound on the exchanges.  
 
     III 
 
There was, however, two other factors contributing to sterling's weakness. The first of 
these stemmed from the growing instability of the Bretton Woods international 
monetary order based on fixed exchange rates and the convertibility of the world's 
leading reserve currency, the dollar, into gold. Unfortunately the dollar as well as 
sterling had accumulated considerable liabilities by the mid 1960s. These, the dollar 
balances above all, had provided the liquidity which had underpinned the expansion of 
world trade since the late 1940s. There had been a steady outflow of dollars from the 
USA, caused initially by foreign assistance programmes such as Marshall aid but then 
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sustained by military spending overseas (now including the commitment to the Vietnam 
war), imports, and foreign investment, mainly by multinational corporations. The latter 
had from the late 1950s been building factories or buying up firms, especially in 
Western Europe. This process had led to an accumulation of dollars in the world 
economy, some of which were held by the central banks of surplus countries such as 
West Germany or France. Others were deposited in private banks, many of them in 
London, and became known as 'Eurodollars' (Figure 1). They remained acceptable to 
the holders because of the dollar's convertibility into gold at $35 to 1 ounce, but by the 
early 1960s there were increasing anxieties on the part of the Americans themselves 
and their creditors that US liabilities far exceeded the reserves available to honour such 
obligations.  
 
It was appreciated by the IMF that the growth of dollar holdings was a weakness in the 
world monetary system: what would happen if and when US policy began to focus on 
correcting the external position? If supplies of dollars and of gold in the world economy 
became inadequate, some countries would seek to build up their own reserves, essential 
for the financing of external deficits, through protectionist or deflationary steps. The 
effect would be to reduce the reserves of other countries, which would then have to 
respond in kind. The upshot would be a downward spiral of world trade, production and 
employment. One of the most debated schemes to address this issue was the Triffin 
Plan (named after the economist Robert Triffin), which proposed a substantial increase 
in world liquidity
10
. But Triffin was not alone, and by 1963, within the UK, both the 
Conservative Chancellor (Reginald Maudling) and the Labour Opposition leader 
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Harold Wilson were proposing that the IMF 'create international credit parri passu with 
the development of world trade'
11
.  
 
The UK's campaign for extra liquidity was driven by two considerations. First, both the 
Conservative government of Harold Macmillan and Wilson's subsequent Labour 
administration were committed to expansionary economic strategies. But Chancellor 
Maudling's stimulus measures after 1962 had led to a growing current account deficit. 
Access to more generous and automatic external support than provided for by the IMF 
at the time would allow British governments (and others with external financial 
difficulties) to adjust to the deficits without recourse to deflationary measures. 
Secondly, both Maudling and his successor, James Callaghan, believed that it might be 
possible for sterling holders to exchange their balances for a new reserve asset to be 
held by the Fund, hence reducing the vulnerability of the reserves to runs on the pound 
caused by 'confidence' rather than trade factors
12
. Callaghan was especially committed 
to reform of the international monetary system based on the creation of more liquidity. 
He pointed out that the commitment of US and UK governments to ‘a quantum of 
foreign currency’, governed by the actual needs of international commerce and ‘capable 
of  deliberate expansion and contraction to offset deflationary and inflationary 
tendencies’, went back to the 1940s, when Lord Keynes had launched his plan for an 
International Clearing Union
13
.  
 
An international monetary system which ensured the compatibility of full employment 
and national economic expansion with membership of an open world economy 
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provided the foundation of the social-democratic synthesis for which Keynes had 
worked in his last years
14
, and to which the Labour Party itself had been committed 
since 1945
15
. The party had remained true to this tradition under the leadership of Hugh 
Gaitskell and Harold Wilson. Its National Plan for the modernization of the economy, 
launched in 1965, explicitly stated the government’s commitment to the market 
economy
16
 and took an ‘indicative’ approach based on co-operation between the 
government, private industry and the trade unions. The objective was an annual average 
growth rate of 3.8 per cent (reduced in 1966 to 3 per cent as a result of ongoing balance 
of payments problems). This attempt to construct a 'New Britain' depended on 
engagement with a global economic environment which would support growth-oriented 
policies: international monetary reform designed to improve liquidity was therefore a 
national interest, especially after Labour's election in October 1964.   
      
Discussions about international monetary reform had started within the IMF during the 
early 1960s. But Britain's enthusiasm for more liquidity was not powerful enough to 
prevent the talks from lasting for the best part of six years, concluding with the Fund's 
adoption of the Special Drawing Right at its AGM in September 1968. The inability of 
the world's ten wealthiest states (known as the Group of Ten) and the IMF to reach a 
consensus on international monetary reform meant that the growth of global trade and 
finance continued to depend on two reserve currencies whose value was not universally 
trusted. Why did the talks take so long? One problem derived from US anxiety that the 
creation of a new reserve asset might lead to a decline in the use of the dollar as an 
international reserve currency: until well into the Johnson Presidency the consensus in 
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Washington was that a series of ad hoc measures to preserve exchange rate stability 
(known as the 'ad hocceries') together with steps to restrict the flow of capital out of the 
USA and a successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round of multilateral tariff 
reductions, would bring the deficit back under control and lead to its elimination
17
. 
Washington's 'ad hocceries' were focussed on the gold pool, set up in 1961; the General 
Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), 1961; and the swap network, which started in 
February 1962. The first of these allowed for intervention by the leading industrial 
powers to prevent the price of gold rising against the dollar, by co-operation in buying 
gold when the price slipped and in selling it when the price of gold rose. The second led 
to an expansion of $6 billion in IMF resources, to be managed by the Group of Ten. 
The third involved the extension of short-term (usually three month) mutual credit 
facilities between the central banks of the Group of Ten (including Switzerland) and 
administered by the Bank for International Settlements in Basle (BIS). These could be 
drawn on to counteract speculative flows of money out of one currency and into 
another which might otherwise have led governments under attack in this manner to 
invoke trade and exchange controls, devaluations, or currency floats
18
.  
 
It was not until after he won the November 1964 Presidential election that Johnson felt 
confident enough to consider moving beyond such piecemeal tinkering. There was, 
however, another major obstacle in the way of rapid international agreement. This was 
the attitude of the French
19
. The French President, General de Gaulle, argued that the 
US had used the dollar's status as the world's leading international reserve currency to 
accumulate excessive amounts of credit from the world's leading industrial powers. By 
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1965 the French were committed to a reform scheme of their own, based upon an 
increase in the price of gold and the creation of a new reserve asset, partially 
convertible into gold, to supplement (and ultimately replace) the dollar: the Collective 
Reserve Unit
20
. Finally, the pace of the talks was held back by the determination of the 
six countries comprising the European Economic Community (EEC) to negotiate with a 
single voice, to boost its international bargaining power. The problem was that there 
were significant differences within the six. The French determination to undermine the 
position of the dollar was not shared by the other Five, whose main concern was not 
about replacing the current system but keeping it and introducing more liquidity, while 
ensuring that debtors would not be indulged.  
 
It followed that there could be no rapid external solution to the British problem, and 
London was left negotiating with the Group of Ten, the Fund, the USA and the BIS, to 
establish its own network of 'ac hocceries', based on IMF support and on short term 
central banks loans and swap agreements designed to protect sterling and the reserves. 
This failure to resolve the international liquidity problem enhanced the vulnerability of 
the reserve currencies to speculative movements based on anxiety that they would be 
devalued. And the growth of such speculative movements of money across national 
borders, notably in the form of Eurodollars, was a second reason for questioning the 
prospects for future international economic stability. 
 
Eurodollar balances had expanded with the trend to trade and payments liberalization 
common to most advanced industrial states from the later 1950s. To begin with, they 
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were driven by the efforts of US banks and multinational corporations to escape from 
exchange controls and banking regulations at home. This outflow of dollars from the 
USA then accelerated as American corporations began to increase direct investment in 
Western Europe, attracted by relatively lower wage costs and rapidly expanding 
markets. Although the growth of this new market was driven by developments in the 
US economy, continental banks and companies were contributing by the second half of 
the 1960s. All these firms tended not to repatriate their overseas earnings but either 
placed them in banks where they could be drawn on for investment or moved them 
from one financial centre and one national currency to another in search of a good rate 
of return, dependent on interest rate changes (and expectations of exchange rate 
alterations)
21
.  
 
The most favoured destination for these funds was London, and by the end of 1965, out 
of total Eurodollar deposits of $9102m, $4257m (46.8 per cent) was banked there
22
. 
London was home to a large short-term money market which was highly attractive, 
especially to US banks. They were able to offer their dollars on the European inter-bank 
market or convert them into sterling loans (usually of three months) to UK local 
authorities and hire purchase companies, where rates were generally between 0.5 and 1 
per cent higher than those offered by Treasury Bills
23
. This option also appealed to non-
dollar Non Sterling Area (NSA) interests, many of whom were private organizations 
rather than official institutions.  
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The increasing interdependence of capital markets in leading industrial states during the 
1960s, arguably a key stage in the development of economic globalization, generated 
an international financial community, dominated initially by the IMF and the BIS, with 
its own priorities. The most significant of these was 'confidence', which when applied 
to Britain meant assurance that the government was genuinely committed to an 
economic strategy capable of delivering a balance of payments surplus at the prevailing 
exchange rate within the short to medium term. The fragility of sterling's position was 
demonstrated in the sterling crises of 1964-67: on each occasion the catalyst was indeed 
a lack of confidence in the currency's future as an international reserve currency.  
 
Figure 1: Estimated Size of the Eurodollar market ($bn).  
Source: BIS Annual Reports, 1965-70 
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The question of 'confidence' was, however,  increasingly complicated by the freedom of 
the rapidly growing mobile private funds to move in and out of national currencies 
regardless of the opinion of international organizations such as the IMF or of the BIS 
and the central banks of the Group of Ten. Their motives were often speculative: the 
sterling crisis of November 1964 was exacerbated by short selling (dealers borrowed 
sterling and then sold it for dollars, anticipating that they would be able to repay their 
debts at a profit following the devaluation of the currency) on the New York market
24
. 
NSA sterling balances, held by foreign central banks, governments, corporations, banks 
and private individuals, fell by almost £500m from July through to the middle of 
November 1967
25
. As long as this somewhat febrile external environment lasted it 
turned the search for a macroeconomic strategy which would win the confidence of the 
markets into Labour’s ignis fatuus. 1968-9 was to see runs on the pound which 
occurred even after the government's post-devaluation economic strategy had been 
endorsed by the IMF and the Group of Ten.  
 
     IV 
 
A sustained and considerable current account surplus may not have been a sufficient 
condition of restoring confidence to sterling, but it was a necessary one. Detailed 
contingency planning for devaluation had been ongoing within the Treasury and the 
Bank of England since the first half of 1965. The civil servants and advisers involved 
understood that devaluation would have to be accompanied by action to ensure that the 
home market did not pre-empt the resources required for an export drive
26
. When the 
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pound was devalued, therefore, supporting measures were quickly introduced by the 
government. The new rate was supported by an IMF standby credit of $1.4 billion, 
short-term central bank credits (on a three month, renewable, basis) worth $1.425 
billion, and steps designed to curb the expansion of the home market. These included a 
rise of 2 percentage points in the Bank Rate as well as hire purchase restrictions, tax 
rises and spending cuts designed to reduce demand by between £400m and £450m. The 
package was intended to be the first stage of a programme for the transformation of the 
British external position, called the 'Switch of Resources Strategy' and designed to 
rebalance the economy in favour of export-led growth
27
. It was accepted that, thanks to 
the expected operation of the J-curve following devaluation, export values would only 
start to overtake import values in the last quarter of 1968, but the measures were 
expected to deliver a balance of payments surplus worth £500m by the end of 1969. 
The second stage, involving further measures to limit home demand, would be 
introduced in the spring Budget.  
 
This two-stage approach failed to inspire confidence. It was greeted with dismay by Sir 
Leslie O'Brien, Governor of the Bank of England, who argued that more needed to be 
done now; otherwise it would not be clear to the markets that the government was 
serious about reducing demand in the home market and transferring resources to 
production for exports. He said that the steps announced so far might be intended to 
reduce demand at home by £400m, but their impact would be more modest than this, 
and given the focus on tax and monetary changes they would fall most heavily on 
business and industry
28
. This would not assist the export drive.  
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O'Brien's misgivings were reinforced a few weeks later, as a result of meeting other 
central bankers at the BIS in Basle. He reported that his colleagues possessed little 
confidence in the government's approach, an assessment confirmed by the development 
of pressure on sterling in the markets. It was down at $2.38. O'Brien argued that unless 
the government acted very soon it would struggle to hold the new parity. He said that 
only a programme of public spending cuts, to be brought forward at the earliest 
opportunity, would guarantee the new rate. Moreover, since a devaluation to a new 
fixed rate would be unthinkable (there not being enough resources, in terms of reserves 
and foreign credit) to support it, it would be necessary to consider whether or not a 
sterling float was now inevitable (and the direction would be downwards)
29
. A further 
slide in sterling would mean 'a total and explicit failure of policy'
30
.  
 
O'Brien's anxieties found support within the OECD and the IMF. Finance Ministers of 
Working Party 3 of the OECD met every month to monitor members' balance of 
payments positions and the steps taken by surplus and deficit countries to return closer 
to equilibrium. At the December meeting Christopher Dow (OECD Secretariat) 
complained that there were times when the UK 'gave the awful impression of a man 
standing in a lake of water, whose only ambition was that the water would not rise 
much above his chin'
31
. Notwithstanding the standby arrangement, the IMF had 
doubted from devaluation onwards whether the government was doing enough to hold 
down public expenditure. The winter of 1967-68 saw an outside world unconvinced 
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that the government was aiming for an economy capable not just of paying off existing 
debt but of maintaining a surplus thereafter. 
 
The Treasury's initial response was that there was no need for precipitate deflationary 
action on the domestic front. There was already (so the argument went) slack in the 
economy (unemployment was over 2.3 per cent, unusually high by the standards of the 
1960s) which could be turned over to production for the export market. The Budget was 
the time for any further action; by that stage it would be possible to forecast the likely 
growth of domestic output for the period up to 1970, and adjust it if necessary with 
taxation rises and expenditure cuts. This was however the line that had damaged 
confidence, and both Callaghan's replacement as Chancellor, Roy Jenkins, and Wilson 
became worried about the possibility of another crisis. The urgency of the situation was 
underlined when it became clear that the economy was now actually expanding fast, 
possibly by as much as an annual rate of 4.5 per cent, thanks to steps to ease credit and 
increase public spending taken back in the summer of 1967, when it had seemed as if 
the main issue was rising joblessness and slow growth. Wilson warned the TUC that the 
country was experiencing a consumer boom
32
. In December both Prime Minister and 
Chancellor therefore set to work on a programme of public spending reductions, with 
the clear intention that this would be complemented by a tough March Budget. A White 
Paper announcing details of some dramatic cuts was released in the second half of 
January. They included the historic commitment to withdraw from a military presence 
east of Suez by 1971 as well as decisions to reintroduce NHS prescription charges and 
to postpone the raising of the school leaving age from fifteen to sixteen
33
.The 
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economies amounted to reductions of almost £700m in civil expenditure programmes 
up to 1970 plus savings of £350m from defence up to 1976.  
 
Wilson and Jenkins had seized the initiative so that the post devaluation 
macroeconomic strategy could proceed free from crisis. The White Paper was well 
received in the OECD, as being of 'major political significance'. But even here the point 
was made that the cuts were not likely to have an early impact. The economy was still 
likely to grow at a rate of more than 4 per cent in the current year; this was likely to 
stimulate the home market, attract imports and therefore exaggerate the impact of the J-
curve on the balance of payments. Both the Dutch and the German representatives in 
Working Party 3 suggested that a growth rate of 3 per cent was more compatible with 
the government's objectives. If the government's strategy was to retain credibility the 
coming Budget would have to restrain demand by at least £400m in 1968-69
34
.  
 
Within the Bank of England and the City there was even more pronounced scepticism 
about the long-term prospects facing the economy, and some sympathy for the view of 
former Bank of England Governor Lord Cromer that a second devaluation was likely 
before long
35
.Some of the opinions expressed were characterised by a pessimism which 
was barely rational, and were motivated by a political distaste for the Labour 
government
36
, but with the monthly trade figures throughout the first half of the year 
showing an unexpected surge in imports
37
 they were not wholly unjustified
38
. Despite a 
slackening in the pressure on sterling during February, the government was still some 
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way from gaining the confidence of either the international financial institutions or the 
markets.  
 
Both Wilson and Jenkins were aware that the Budget was of fundamental importance to 
the success of the government's strategy, in terms both of the measures within it and of 
its impact on confidence. The importance of action to restore this was clear, with 
sterling remaining vulnerable on the exchanges during February and early March. The 
trade figures for the four months since devaluation showed a big leap in imports, which 
were running on average £80m a month higher than prior to the change in the sterling 
rate
39
. Exports were performing well, but the returns did little to reassure those who 
doubted the effectiveness and urgency with which Labour was pursuing its strategy. 
Gilt-edged stocks lost ground when the March figures were announced, and sterling fell 
both on the spot and forward market
40
. 
 
Throughout January, February and the first half of March the Treasury therefore 
focussed on the Budget. Jenkins worked on the assumption that the external surplus 
Labour required made it  necessary to aim for a 3 per cent annual growth level rather 
than maintain the current 4 per cent annual rate of expansion. To this end, he 
determined to take a minimum of £500m out of the economy, largely through a rise in 
indirect taxation (which would bear directly on consumption), but the final version 
went a good deal further than this, raising £923m.. This even exceeded the kind of 
figures suggested by the OECD’s Working Party 3, which early in March called for an 
increase in taxation ranging from £450m-£800m
41
. 
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The combination of tax increases and spending cuts amounted to a very powerful dose 
of deflation, possibly the most severe since the war. Writing in the Times immediately 
after the Budget, Peter Jay wrote that the Chancellor had ‘risen fully and magnificently 
to the occasion. Yesterday’s Budget was really everything that was economically 
needed. It should give devaluation a virtually certain guarantee of success’. He went on 
to say that the UK had now ‘done everything required to correct the fundamental 
weakness of the economy and the balance of payments which has bedevilled economic 
policy as well as international adjustment most of this decade’42. But even before the 
government's strategy had been announced in the 19 March Budget it had almost been 
wrecked by another foreign exchange crisis. Notwithstanding the weak state of foreign 
confidence in the British economy within international organisations and the financial 
markets (at least, in March 1968), the roots of this crisis, and of those occurring in 
November 1968 and August 1969, can be traced to the growing weakness of the 
Bretton Woods order. 
   
      V 
 
There were three fundamental conditions for the success of Labour's post-devaluation 
strategy. The first of these was the maintenance of the Bretton Woods order of fixed 
exchange rates
43
. The continued existence of this system guaranteed an external 
environment in which pressures on sterling would be minimised through international 
collaboration between the advanced industrial states and through an expansionary 
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economic climate conducive to the promotion of exports
44
.  The alternative was seen as 
'monetary breakdown', in which nations running deficits embraced economic 
nationalism and what were called the 'beggar thy neighbour' practices of the 1930s. 
These revolved competitive devaluations (or floating rates) and protectionist measures 
in trade
45
. The second condition was a surge in exports and restraint in imports. The 
third was the curbing of demand at home via both deflationary monetary and fiscal 
measures and an incomes policy
46
.  
 
All three of these conditions were threatened by the March 1968 crisis
47
. This was 
provoked by developments in Vietnam. During the Tet offensive of February 1968 Viet 
Cong forces had for a time succeeded in reaching Saigon and even in penetrating the 
US Embassy compound. Although the battle had ended in defeat for the Viet Cong, the 
impression it left behind was that no early end to the Vietnam War was likely. It 
followed that the commitment of US forces and material to the support of the South 
Vietnamese regime would be ongoing for several years. The result was to stimulate 
vigorous speculation against the dollar, on the grounds that the strategic fallout from 
Tet would undermine President Johnson's latest efforts to turn around the US deficit, 
announced over New Year 1968
48
. A mounting demand for gold became evident in the 
London gold pool. This turned into a rush following a call on the part of senior US 
Senator Jacob Javits that dollar-gold convertibility be abandoned, which in turn fed 
speculative expectations of a rise in the price of gold against the dollar
49
.  
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Sterling then came under heavy pressure as holders sold it for dollars which they were 
able to turn into gold. As the selling mounted, so did market expectations that the new 
parity might have to be sacrificed. The sterling three month forward rate, often a key 
indicator of medium-term expectations concerning a currency's future, showed a 
discount of 5.75 cents on the official parity in New York on 14 March
50
. There was 
heavy intervention by the Bank of England on the spot market, but this led to a rapid 
rundown of the exiguous foreign exchange reserves. During the first half of the month 
they fell by $1441m, from $2771m to $1340m
51
. Substantial drawings were then made 
on the central bank credit facilities arranged to support sterling after its devaluation. 
These drawings became necessary in order to keep the net loss to the reserves down to 
$912m (£380m) for the first three weeks of March
52
, but they added to the country's 
liabilities. The Treasury calculated that by 14 March the negative reserve position had 
deteriorated to -£881m
53
. Frightened by the reserve losses and the scale of the action 
needed to contain them, the Bank let the spot rate fall to $2.3740 in New York on 15 
March
54
. This undershot the $2.38 floor level below which, under the Bretton Woods 
rules, sterling was not supposed to drop unless it was going to be formally devalued. 
The failure to intervene was greeted with great dismay in the Treasury
55
 but defended 
by the Bank on the grounds that distrust for the currency was too widespread. It feared 
a repeat of what had happened on day before the announcement of the November 
devaluation, when £500m ($1.4 billion at the old rate) had flowed out of the reserves
56
. 
Sterling balance losses reinforced these anxieties: as the crisis intensified in the first 
two weeks of March, the balances were run down by £180m. Most of this (£155m) 
switching was undertaken by NSA sterling holders who were concerned about the 
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possibility of a second devaluation
57
. O'Brien warned Jenkins that the position of 
sterling was becoming unsustainable; he would have to let it float
58
. 
 
The gold rush reached a peak in the week starting Monday 11 March. By Thursday 14 
March the US Treasury was worried that demand for gold was forcing its price to a 
point which would either force a dollar devaluation against gold or render gold-dollar 
convertibility unsustainable. It therefore asked the British to close the London gold 
market on the Friday. Wilson and Jenkins agreed, and a Bank holiday was declared. In 
part, the willingness to accede to the US request was born out of concern that the entire 
Bretton Woods edifice was in danger of failing. But the real possibility that another 
£300m or £400m might be lost to the reserves very quickly if the gold-buying spree 
was not arrested was an even more immediate concern. As O'Brien had said, this would 
certainly have made it impossible to hold the rate, precipitating either another sterling 
devaluation or a downward float of the currency
59
.  
 
The closure of the gold market gave both sterling and the dollar a breathing space while 
a conference in Washington, involving Finance Ministers and officials from the 
countries making up the gold pool, was hastily arranged for the weekend. Its outcome 
was likely to determine both the future of the Bretton Woods system and of the British 
economic strategy. The British made it clear that they needed a new credit package, 
worth $5 billion, to support sterling, and that they favoured agreement on the rise in the 
price of gold against the dollar. They believed the latter would involve a relatively 
painless adjustment for the USA and would draw a line under the speculation. But first 
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indications from Washington were not encouraging. There seemed little enthusiasm for 
more assistance to the UK
60
, while the US President himself was adamant that there 
would be no devaluation of the dollar against gold. Instead the US suggested separating 
the official and the market price of gold. This would involve limiting central bank gold 
market activities. The central banks would abstain from the free market and deal only 
with each other, at the official price. The USA would meanwhile no longer provide 
gold to private parties at $35 an ounce. The gold pool would cease operations. The 
British were not convinced that it would be possible to keep this distinction between the 
free and the official markets. They did however accept the two-tier plan in the hope that 
their own requirement for more assistance would in return gain US backing, while at 
the same time working on contingency plans in case the conference ended in failure. 
These plans were codenamed 'Brutus' (after the Ides of March) and based on 
discussions about floating and its consequences already held in the Bank and the 
Treasury.  
 
There were three versions of Brutus, each one more rigorous than the last. Common to 
each version was the suspension of sterling convertibility for all balances held in the 
NSA and the OSA: no sterling area resident would be able automatically to buy gold or 
foreign exchange from the UK in exchange for existing sterling holdings. Under Brutus 
1, sterling balances holders would be able to run down their holdings only to finance 
imports from the UK. Brutus 2 would result in the blocking of all sterling balances, 
with releases only being allowed for specified purposes. Brutus 3 was the most far-
reaching, since it would not only freeze access to all OSA and NSA balances but also 
 25 
involve the imposition of exchange controls on transactions between UK residents and 
the sterling area; it would mean the 'effective abolition of the sterling area'
61
, with the 
pound's acceptability confined to the UK and Ireland.  
 
The original intention of Brutus was to stop a run on the reserves and therefore 
maintain the parity. It quickly became apparent to the Treasury, however, that, blocking 
and floating were not practical alternatives at all. If Britain floated it would have to 
block (to prevent a mass exodus from sterling). On the other hand, given that blocking 
could only occur once it was obvious that there were not enough reserves to sustain the 
sterling parity, its introduction would have to be accompanied by a float
62
. The question 
facing Wilson and Jenkins therefore became whether to go for a free float or for one 
which would be controlled and limited thanks to the application of one of the varieties 
of Brutus. It was clear that Brutus 1 would be the easiest to introduce quickly – but that 
in the event of continuing international uncertainty it might be necessary to go all the 
way to the much more comprehensive exchange control regime of Brutus 3
63
.  
 
The government was prepared to opt for Brutus 1, moving over a two-three week 
period to Brutus 3
64
. The impact on UK living standards would have been dramatic. 
Not only would foreign travel become restricted (as a result of the need to prevent 
losses of convertible foreign currency from the reserves) but the shortage of foreign 
exchange would mean a reduction of imports to essential goods
65
. Trade with countries 
unwilling to hold sterling would revert to the kind of barter arrangements common 
during and just after World War Two
66
.  
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Within the Bank of England this prospect was regarded with apprehension. O'Brien 
said that he doubted whether effective blocking was feasible in short-run, and that in 
any case the suspension of convertibility would be far more serious for the City than 
floating
67
. It would amount to the declaration of a default, with the effect being similar 
to suspension of cash payments by a bank. But given sterling's status as a reserve 
currency, the bank in question was the second largest in the world, and its actions 
would have brought about the destruction of almost £4 billions' worth of global 
liquidity. Meanwhile British assets would be at risk of retaliatory action on the part of 
overseas (possibly including Commonwealth) governments. Britain's international 
creditworthiness would collapse and sterling's career as an international trading and 
reserve currency would be over
68
. 
 
The government was under no illusions about the implications of Brutus but these were 
regarded as preferable to the domestic and international economic consequences of 
moving to a freely floating rate. A sterling collapse to £1 = £1.50, 37.5 per cent below 
the $2.40 level and 46 per cent below the pre-devaluation rate of $2.80, was feared. 
This would prompt a disorderly withdrawal of as much of £2 billion from the sterling 
balances
69
, leading to bank failures in London and a drastic contraction of credit in the 
UK
70
. It would also intensify strains on the current account, provoke price increases and 
jeopardise trade union consent to pay restraint. On the external front the breach of the 
Bretton Woods rules governing the international monetary system would cause 'great 
confusion', with 'some, perhaps many other countries' expected to let their currencies 
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float as well. There would be further speculative rushes into gold and the 'collapse' of 
the dollar
71
. Jenkins warned his Cabinet colleagues that such a scenario could lead to a 
return to the trade wars of the 1930s, as nation-states embraced protectionism, 
competitive devaluations and floats
72
. Clearly, adoption of a freely floating rate was 
incompatible with the conditions required for the success of Labour's post-devaluation 
strategy.  
 
In the end it was not necessary to introduce any of Brutus's different varieties, although 
the Treasury continued to work on this contingency plan for months. Wilson had called 
the scheme 'blackmail'. Both he and Jenkins saw Brutus as a way of persuading the 
participants at Washington to provide the crucial $5 billion package of external support 
for sterling, and therefore the new economic strategy, by showing them what would be 
the consequences of their failing to do
73
.  The tactic worked. The US was especially 
concerned about what would happen to the dollar-gold relationship if the floating and 
blocking of sterling was introduced
74
. Further backing for sterling was therefore agreed. 
Britain's credit facilities were increased to $4050m. This figure included the $1.4 
standby available with the IMF, plus $1175m in new support. $700m of this was 
provided by the USA, the rest by Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
West Germany. The overall figure was rather less than the government had wanted, but, 
as Jenkins told the Cabinet, 'the small group of Ministers' who had handled the crisis 
were convinced that accepting the support was preferable to Brutus
75
. When the 
markets opened on Monday 18 November both sterling and the dollar made gains, the 
former returning to just over $2.40
76
. The crisis passed and Jenkins was able to present 
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his Budget without disruption. The conference, with its introduction of the two-tier 
market and international support for sterling, had settled the international environment 
and given the British strategy a breathing space in which it could operate free from fear 
of destabilisation at the hands of the markets. Strengthened by the good reception 
accorded to the Budget, sterling stayed at or very near parity for the whole of April.  
    
VI 
 
Further international support for sterling was announced in July, with agreement in the 
talks between the Bank of England and the BIS about a loan to insulate the British 
reserves from diversification out of sterling by balance holders. Alarm on the part of 
European central bankers about the impact on sterling of the gold crisis had been the 
catalyst for this. Concern was expressed that if no international action to support the 
pound was taken, larger balance holders such as Kuwait might diversify into gold and 
undermine the recent Washington agreement to stabilise the dollar-gold relationship. 
Blocking of balances – Brutus - would then be the only action available to the UK to 
avert what the Governor called 'a disorderly disaster'
77
.  
 
This anxiety gave urgency to the talks which had started in February. Early in July the 
BIS stated that it was prepared to offer a $2 billion credit facility to Britain, on which it 
would be possible to draw for three years, with repayment taking as long as ten. The 
Bank of England would then be able to propose to OSA members a dollar guarantee of 
90 per cent of their holdings, in return for a slow and orderly diversification. The next 
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eight weeks saw intense and difficult negotiations with sterling area members
78
, but in 
September the Bank was able to issue a public statement confirming that thirty 
countries, whose holdings accounted for 77 per cent of all the balances, had signed up 
to what were known as the ‘sterling agreements’79. 
 
This was a considerable achievement and brought a longstanding objective of the 
government's external economic policy to a successful conclusion. But it did not lead to 
the construction of the stable international environment which sterling and the 
government's strategy required. After a good run through the summer, the pound came 
under more intense pressure in the autumn. The August and September trade figures 
had been healthy. October's, announced on 13 November, had however been 
disappointing, with imports showing a £13m increase over their level in September. 
The Treasury, aware of the resilience of imports, was preparing another set of measures 
to slow down domestic activity, but as in March a crisis which started abroad almost 
undermined the macroeconomic strategy. This time the problem was centred on 
expectation within the markets that the West German currency, the deutschmark, was 
undervalued against other currencies while the French franc was overvalued
80
.  
 
The German economy had for most of the past decade been generating visible trade 
surpluses, leading to a long period of export-led growth.  By the autumn of 1968 there 
was growing enthusiasm on the part of the markets for deutschmarks. Sentiment in 
favour of the currency surged in September, when the Bundesbank's reserves rose by 
$1.4 billion in ten days, and again in November, when they grew by $2.4 billion over 
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the first three weeks
81
. The timing was provoked by two developments. First, there was 
an increasingly obvious contrast between price stability in West Germany and 
inflationary pressures elsewhere
82
. Secondly rumours (which were accurate
83
) began to 
circulate in the financial markets of the Group of Ten that the Bundesbank supported a 
revaluation of the deutschmark in order to counter the inflationary impact of capital 
inflows on the financial system
84
. Reduction in interest rates within West Germany 
might have deterred this inflow; but such action, in threatening to add to inflationary 
pressures, was not compatible with the priority of low inflation, an imperative of post-
war economic policy in Germany
85
.  
 
The rush for deutschmarks was paralleled by speculation against the franc. This was an 
after effect of the May 'evenements', when France had for a short time been brought to 
a halt by a wave of student unrest and industrial disputes. The franc’s vulnerability was 
intensified by a pay agreement with the unions which provided for a 10 per cent rise in 
wages and shorter working hours
86
. The concessions were bad for international 
confidence in the French economy, notwithstanding only a small trade deficit for the 
year. The franc slipped to its floor level against the dollar and the deutschmark on the 
markets, and there was a steady outflow of capital, with short-term losses amounting to 
$2 billion
87
. This delicate situation became a highly sensitive one in September, which 
saw the lifting of exchange controls and the first wave of speculation in favour of a 
deutschmark revaluation. There was renewed heavy selling of the franc in favour of 
deutschmarks, which intensified in November as speculation that a deutschmark 
revaluation was imminent reached a peak. At a central bankers' meeting in Basle on 16-
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17 November, Brunet, Governor of the Banque de France, told his colleagues that the 
French could not sustain the massive capital losses to Germany for more than another 
week. He would not borrow to protect the franc against the selling. It would therefore 
be necessary to announce devaluation, by as much as 15 per cent, unless there was a 
deutschmark revaluation
88
.  
 
The November crisis posed another serious threat to the maintenance of the Bretton 
Woods order and to sterling. The finance ministers of the OECD met at Bonn on 20 and 
21 November to discuss the question of exchange rate realignment based on franc 
devaluation and deutschmark revaluation. The Times commented that parity of the 
deutschmark against other currencies was now unjustifiably low, 'and is before long 
bound to be changed upwards'
89
. The British and the Americans were looking for a 
German revaluation of between 5 to 10 per cent to offset an expected 10 to 15 per cent 
devaluation of the franc. The German government was, however, known to be reluctant 
to revalue the deutschmark, notwithstanding the views of the Bundesbank. The 
Christian Democratic Union, which shared power with the Social Democrats in a Grand 
Coalition, did not wish to lose the support of farmers and industrial exporters enjoying 
the benefits of a competitive exchange rate
90
. As a result the possibility that the French 
might act alone by a margin as great as 15 per cent became very real. For the British, 
this was extremely disturbing. One problem was that exports might be adversely 
affected by the new level of the franc, with a 15 per cent devaluation likely to cost the 
UK balance of payments between £75m and £80m per annum
91
. In addition, the 
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fundamental cause of the currency instability, the undervalued deutschmark, would still 
exist. With the franc having fallen, speculators would turn on sterling.  
 
During the first half of November sterling did indeed come under pressure, following 
the disappointing October trade figures. On 15 November sterling finished at $2.3840
92
 
and only intervention worth $250m by the Bank of England on that day alone had 
prevented it from falling further
93
. Given short and medium term debt of £3,132m (with 
repayment due in the next 3-5 years)
94
 there was no question of further borrowing to 
support the pound, and there fear within the Treasury and the Bank that the reserves 
would not be able to sustain either the $2.40 rate or a new, lower parity. Contingency 
planning (now called 'Priam') for a float in the event of a French devaluation was 
therefore undertaken. It was recognised that such action would require a deflationary 
support package in order to reassure the markets that another fall in the rate would not 
lead to a degringolade of the currency as a result of inflationary price rises and wage 
settlements. The squeeze would involve import restrictions (known as 'Operation 
Orestes'
95
), and austerity measures to cut domestic demand, via public spending cuts, 
tax rises, credit tightening, and a period of severe pay restraint – all coming on top of 
the action taken in the Budget
96
.  
 
In theory, with the Basle Agreement in place, there would be no need to block the 
sterling balances, but it was accepted that the move to a floating rate would still be 
regarded as 'such a major failure as to lead to a breakdown in confidence in our 
economic management'
97
. The resulting rush from sterling might be too great even for 
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the resources available under Basle, forcing a return to the contingency plans first 
revealed in Brutus
98
. The crisis would be intensified by ongoing external instability, 
since the dollar would be the next domino to fall as speculators continued to seek 
deutschmarks. As in March, the world of Bretton Woods would face eclipse. In order to 
curtail the development of so hostile an environment, the government argued for 
agreement on a new structure of fixed exchange rates, featuring the relationships 
between sterling, the dollar the deutschmark, and the currencies of other EEC 
members
99
 so that they genuinely reflected the surplus and deficit positions of nation-
states within the international trading system
100
.  Jenkins and the US Treasury Secretary 
Fowler went to the Bonn meeting of OECD finance Ministers hoping for a 5 per cent 
revaluation of the deutschmark, seeing this as the first stage of the wider realignment. 
But the German government kept he parity unchanged. Instead they announced a 
reduction in export subsidies, an adjustment of their border tax to raise the price level 
of imports, and restrictions on the inflow of foreign capital
101
.  
 
A unilateral French devaluation was now expected. Information from within the French 
government led Ministers to expect a fall of just over 11 per cent. Treasury projections 
suggested that if the franc was reduced by less than 12 per cent, there was a good 
chance that sterling would survive, but only if more was done to reduce demand for 
imports. To this end the government introduced a package of import deposits, increases 
in indirect taxes (designed to take £350m, or just under 1 per cent of the GDP, out of 
the economy) and credit restrictions aimed at shaving £100m from private sector 
lending by March. At this point President De Gaulle announced, to near universal 
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astonishment, that there would be no franc devaluation. The franc was to be held at its 
current rate with the assistance of a French austerity programme.  
 
In the short term this unexpected turn of events did not upset the markets and both the 
determination of the French and German governments not to budge and the British 
mini-Budget led to calmer conditions (for most of the time) during the next few 
months. The British trade figures for the last part of 1968 showed real improvement; it 
seemed as if the switch of resources strategy was working. At the OECD Working 
Party 3 meeting in December 1968 Otmar Emminger (a member of the Bundesbank 
board) accepted that 'there was now a good chance of the United Kingdom reaching its 
goal’102.  
 
The more peaceful climate allowed to government to reaffirm its strategy at a meeting 
of its Steering Committee on Economic Strategy held on 4 December. The latest 
forecasts indicated that 1969 would see a balance of payments surplus in the region of 
£450m. Wilson and Jenkins made clear their determination that policy should aim to 
facilitate by the end of 1969 the achievement of the £500m annual current account 
surplus, to be sustained for several years thereafter. Only by continuing to remain in the 
black on this scale would governments be able to repay debt and preside over steady, 
crisis-free expansion of the economy at the 3 per cent annual rate of growth which 
remained the target
103
. This was rather unambitious for some Cabinet colleagues, who 
called for adoption of an alternative strategy based on the adoption of protectionist 
measures to prevent domestic expansion from being derailed by balance of payments 
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difficulties
104
. These were, however, rejected. Wilson, Jenkins and Callaghan all argued 
that such an approach would, in adding to domestic demand, divert resources from 
production for exports
105
.  
     
    VII 
 
The stability which followed the events of November came to an abrupt end in the 
summer of 1969, and the last sterling crisis faced by Wilson's Labour government 
lasted erupted in August 1969. This had less to do with the British trade performance 
and the long-term prospects facing the economy than any of the perturbations faced by 
sterling since the autumn of 1964. It followed instead from the failure of the Bonn 
meeting to agree a co-ordinated exchange-rate realignment centring on a deutschmark 
revaluation and franc devaluation, and led to a short-lived burst of enthusiasm for 
floating within the Treasury, much to Jenkins's alarm.  
 
During the first nine months of 1969 the monthly balance of payments figures had for 
the most part been good and by mid July Jenkins was able to announce a net 
improvement to the foreign exchange reserves of $1 billion since January
106
. The lurch 
into instability which followed resulted from the realization of the scenario considered 
in the Priam contingency plan. The French unilaterally devalued the franc on 8 August 
(resistance to the move having collapsed after the resignation of President De Gaulle at 
the end of April). Predictably, this led to another wave of speculation in favour of a 
deutschmark revaluation, and, equally predictably, sterling found itself under pressure. 
 36 
On 14 August spot market sterling fell to $2.3812, with the Bank letting the rate rather 
than the reserves take the strain
107
. The 90-day forward rate fell to $2.35. It remained 
low, slipping even further, to $2.3431 on 10 September, the day after a short outbreak 
of fighting in the Middle East (Figure 2).   
 
The Bank's behaviour was indicative of a growing interest in floating, or at least more 
flexible rates, both within its own walls and within the Treasury. In part this stemmed 
from concern about the sustainability of the current fixed rate regime, given the large 
currency imbalances now within the system. This thinking was reflected in the pages of 
influential weekly journals such as The Economist. Here, the virtues of floating had 
been proclaimed for some time, on the grounds that they permitted automatic 
adjustment to disequilibria, and therefore made unnecessary both dramatic IMF and 
central bank support deals and recourse to credit squeezes and import and exchange 
controls by states facing speculative attacks on their currency
108
. In addition, however, 
there was within the Treasury an outburst of gloom about whether the devaluation of 
sterling had worked, prompting concern that $2.40 was now too high
109
.  
 
Jenkins regarded all these views as 'defeatism'. He was confident that that the 
devaluation had worked. To agree to a reduction in the sterling rate now would 'be to 
throw away victory just when we were achieving it'
110
, a view confirmed by excellent 
July and August trade figures. Far from accepting the new thinking, Jenkins told the 
IMF Annual General Meeting in late September that he favoured fixed rates. There 
was, he argued, a case for a wider margin either side of parity rather than the 1 per cent 
 37 
which was currently allowed (he favoured 2 per cent). But floating rates were neither 
'desirable' nor 'durable', said the Chancellor. He maintained that most economies now 
had foreign trade sectors which were so large that national governments would not wish 
to surrender control of exchange rates to market forces. At the same time the growth of 
trade had generated economic interdependence between nations, and this would be 
undermined by floating rates
111
.  
 
All the objective evidence about what was happening to the economy backed Jenkins. 
Since November 1967 the government had striven with success to switch resources into 
the export sector. Its achievement was now recognised within the IMF
112
, the 
Bundesbank and the US Treasury
113
. Yet the price of  90 day forward sterling remained 
almost four cents below par. The problem was that the fate of the currency was not 
within its complete control but dependent on external events. This became obvious 
when sterling began a strong recovery after 29 September, the day a new West German 
government, now a Centre-Left coalition of the Social Democrats and the Free 
Democrats, allowed the deutschmark to float. As expected the deutschmark moved up, 
and its new level was confirmed on 24 October when a 9.29 per cent revaluation was 
announced. The effect of the new deutschmark rate was to put a temporary end to the 
speculative waves which had been afflicting the international economy for the best part 
of the decade. Sterling's three month forward rate jumped, reaching the same level as in 
the spot market. By mid October it exceeded $2.39, where it remained (occasionally 
reaching parity) for the rest of Labour's time in power. 
 
 38 
 
Sterling spot and forward rates 1 August-20 October 1969 (source: The Times foreign exchange reports)
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Sterling's freedom from turbulence was a function in part of the government's 
achievement but also of greater international economic stability. Economic historians 
and other commentators have argued that the upheavals of 1967-69 marked the 
beginning of the end for the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which 
finally collapsed between 1971 and 1973
114
. Yet it did not seem at the time as if an era 
was drawing to a close. Indeed, 1969 appeared to have been the year when important 
and constructive improvements had been made to the Bretton Woods order. September 
saw the launching of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), to be managed by the IMF. The 
SDR was the outcome of the discussions about international liquidity which had started 
in the early 1960s. Its creation involved an addition of $49 billion to global reserves; it 
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was a supplement to international liquidity which did not add to the global surplus of 
dollars and thus to the growing volume of mobile short-term capital. The SDR was, 
therefore, intended to promote an international economic system which harmonised 
exchange rate stability, open trade and convertible currencies, and national expansion. 
The BIS, pointing to this reform, to the British surplus and to the franc and 
deutschmark exchange rate realignments, argued that the international monetary system 
had finished an 'eventful' year in a sounder condition than at the start
115
.  
 
This more stable external environment allowed Labour to complete its post devaluation 
strategy successfully. Labour had fallen short of the growth target in the National Plan 
of 1965, but much of the agenda contained within that document was being pursued. 
Expenditure on roads, housing, education and health had all increased broadly if not 
exactly in line with the projections in the Plan, while defence had been held down
116
. 
By March 1970 the combination of large external surpluses (£554 million in 1969, with 
an even more sizeable one expected for the current year
117
) and expectations of 
sustained growth running at 3 per cent had led the OECD to declare that Britain was 'no 
longer a problem country'
118
. By the spring of 1970, all outstanding short and medium 
term obligations had been met; this included $1400m borrowed from the IMF in May 
1965, the last instalment of which was repaid two months ahead of schedule at the end 
of March
119
. The achievement came at a high political cost: the restraints on private 
consumption which had been necessary to ensure Labour met its objectives are 
generally held to have cost it the 1970 general election
120
. It was the Conservative Party 
which inherited the opportunity for sustained expansion Labour had struggled to create. 
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     VIII 
 
The events of 1968-69 had represented a major challenge to the Labour government 
because they threatened to result in the collapse of the external environment which 
supported British social democracy. The recurrent shocks to sterling in 1968-69 
stemmed from the failure of the November 1967 devaluation to stabilise the foreign 
exchange markets, partly because these were unconvinced that Labour's initial response 
would deliver the scale of external surplus required to lift sterling out of further danger. 
But during the course of 1968 the leading cause of sterling's woes became the 
interaction between the dollar, the franc and the deutschmark and the Eurodollar 
market. The existence of currency rates which did not reflect the current account 
positions of the economies in question gave the growing volume of Eurodollar balances 
the chance to move from one financial centre to another in search of speculative 
reward. In the absence of international co-operation Britain could only have insulated 
itself from the shocks involved in these movements by measures such as Brutus or 
Priam, which involved the abandonment of liberal socialism, or by the adoption of 
floating rates mitigated by severe deflation. In either case, a repudiation of the post-
1945 social democratic synthesis would have been necessary.   
 
Labour's own macroeconomic strategy, in combination with the Basle arrangements 
and the French and German currency moves, had averted the need for such drastic 
action. But the stability which returned to the international financial system late in 1969 
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was transient. The problem of the US deficit remained, although in 1968-69 the 
position was masked by capital inflows, attracted by higher interest rates in the USA 
than in Western Europe. In 1970 and 1971, however, these were reversed as the US 
authorities responded to sluggish growth by cutting taxes and interest rates. Capital 
flooded back to Europe as a result. European governments, worried that the incoming 
funds were either going to force unwanted exchange rate revaluations (which would be 
damaging for exports) or unwelcome credit booms, vainly called for the USA to adjust 
to its deficit by raising taxes and interest rates. By 1971 the USA was running a current 
account deficit of $3.8 billion, while the capital account was $26.9 billion in the red
121
. 
There was a renewal of international anxiety about the ability of the USA to honour 
dollar-gold convertibility, and the spring and summer of 1971 saw vigorous speculation 
in favour of most other currencies in the Group of Ten. The Germans, Dutch and 
Belgians floated against the dollar, while the Swiss and Austrians revalued. Finally, 
with the price of gold in the private market by August 1971 reaching $44 to the ounce, 
the USA abandoned dollar-gold convertibility and introduced a 10 per cent import tax 
rather than embark on a tough deflationary programme. Sterling itself became a fully 
floating currency in June 1972.  
 
All this marked the collapse of the Bretton Woods order. The continued compatibility 
of fixed rates, an open trading system and domestic expansion after 1945 had become 
unsustainable. In the circumstances, governments now found it easiest to adjust to 
payments imbalances by allowing exchange rates to take the strain. There was no 
economy large enough to replace the role of creditor played by the United States in the 
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generation after 1945. Promising though the SDR was, it was not capable of supporting 
the Bretton Woods system: its first issue came in January 1970, under the management 
of the IMF. The total of $49 billion was more modest than it seemed, since the release 
was to be spread over a three year period. In any case, by 1970 the chief threat to 
Bretton Woods lay in the excess of liquidity being generated by the US deficit, a 
problem which could only be solved within the Bretton Woods parameters by deflation 
in the USA, or by some combination of multilateral exchange rate realignment and 
more rapid expansion on the part of the Europeans and the Japanese. Not one of these 
options was acceptable to all parties. As a result, the members of the Group of Ten 
opted to sacrifice fixed rates rather than full employment and a participation in the 
global trading system which had delivered abundant rewards, in terms of what Alan 
Milward has called 'increasing ease of life', to working populations
122
.  
 
At first, as an international boom developed in 1970-73, it seemed as if the anxieties 
expressed about the implications of floating in the late 1960s had been seriously 
overcooked. Floating rates appeared capable of providing an environment which had all 
the advantages of Bretton Woods without the disadvantages. But the coming of the oil 
price shock in 1973-74 led to the appearance of currency disequilibria so large that it 
became increasingly hard to reconcile floating rates with open trade and international 
expansion. Labour, back in power from 1974, was to face the reappearance of the 
dilemma which had threatened it in 1967-69: the preservation of domestic expansion 
and high levels of employment behind protectionist barriers, or continued engagement 
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with the open international trading system, at the price of domestic deflation and the 
erosion of national economic sovereignty by market forces. 
 
The Wilson and Callaghan governments of 1974-79 succeeded in avoiding having to 
make this choice. Callaghan's famous 1976 Labour Party Conference speech, despite 
appearing to reject Keynesianism, did not involve a philosophical breach with the post-
1945 politico-economic tradition
123
. But the cost of sustaining the Keynesian synthesis, 
involving restraints on personal income and public expenditure, as well as 
unemployment at just over 5 per cent of the work force (at the time a post-1945 
high)
124
, led to the collapse of support for it within the Labour Party. In 1981 the party 
split. A significant fraction of those who considered themselves Keynesians and liberal 
socialists (Roy Jenkins amongst them) left to join the new Social Democratic Party. 
The majority which was left behind adopted, not always enthusiastically,
125
 the 
Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) which involved extensions of public ownership, 
economic planning, and controls on imports and on the movement of capital. The main 
condition of the AES was 'the substantial severing of the ties which bind the British 
economy to the world economy', in order to establish a 'full economic sovereignty' 
designed to protect policy from being 'undermined by foreign pressures'
126
. The origins 
of this schism can be traced to the slow disintegration of the Bretton Woods order, 
which as it unravelled had slowly destabilised the external environment congenial to 
British social democracy.  
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It is not clear that the contradiction between increasingly free global trade and capital 
markets and the pursuit of economic growth and full employment by national 
governments can be resolved in the absence both of international support for debtor 
countries and of agreed arrangements to facilitate smooth adjustments to exchange rate 
disequilibria (a problem highlighted by the current crisis in the Euro group). Since the 
end of the 1970s the question for the Left in Britain and beyond has become how, and 
on what terms, co-existence between national social democracy and an open world 
economy can be managed
127
. The electoral failure of the AES in 1983 led to a gradual 
accommodation between the British Labour Party and an international economy 
moving rapidly towards globalization. The result was the liberal political economy of 
New Labour, a synthesis now facing its own crisis as a result of the breakdown, albeit 
possibly temporary, of the external environment which sustained it
128
.  
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